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Abstract: For over 50 years to measure safety performance the Lost Time Incident Rate, LTIR 
was used. Fortunately, over the years the learning attitude towards accidents changed 
from a retrospective to a pro-active one. In the 90-s the safety management system was 
introduced. No management though, without the Deming cycle of Plan, Do, Check, 
Act, and checking, means the need of indicators. Existing LTIR-values were used not 
realizing these refl ect personal rather than process safety. In 2005 after the BP Texas City 
refi nery vapor cloud explosion, awareness of the difference broke through and Process 
Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics were formulated. In January 2012 an international 
conference was held in Brussels organized by EPSC and CEFIC. Results will be 
summarized. The paper will explain briefl y, where we are now, and what still is ahead.
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Introduction
One of the fi rst issues to discuss in the newly 
founded Working Party on Loss Prevention 
and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries 
(as its full name was) of the European Federation of 
Chemical Engineering (EFCE) in the fi rst half of the 
1970s was the cause of the order of magnitude gap in 
an indicator value between American companies and 
European ones. This concerned the LTIR - Lost Time 
Injury Rate - or LTIF - Lost Time Injury Frequency - 
as hours lost per unit of total worked hours in a plant. 
As registration unit different numbers of hours were 
in use, but most often the rate was expressed per 
one million worked hours. At the time we didn’t 
take the step to generalize it as an indicator, but just 
discussed the causes of the differences of this rate 
since it was the only statistic available. European 
plants had roughly a factor ten higher rates than the 
U.S. ones. All kinds of bias possibilities and causes 
were mentioned. Registration biases could, however, 
at a certain stage is ruled out because the BASF plant 
in the U.S. had also a ten times lower rate than the 
plants in Ludwigshafen. Since it further appeared 
that each year considerable improvement was made, 
as shown for example by the Shell company record 
in Fig. 1, which is typical for the branch, after 
a while nobody asked for the background anymore.
Improvement of the LTIR is still continuing. 
Fig. 2 gives a more recent picture of the International 
Association of Oil & Gas Producers and of the Dow 
Chemical Company.
Fig. 1 Example of improvement made over the 
years in reducing the number of accidents with 
the effect of an injury preventing the worker to 
be at work for some time for a major company as 
Shell and how smaller fi rms picking up outsourced 
(maintenance) work, had to catch up with the trend 
(Visser, 1995)
In particular at the end of the 1990s there was 
a strong optimism that the state of zero accidents 
could be reached soon, as illustrated by the graph 
from the Norsk Hydro Annual report 1998.
Beside the trend of preventing accidents, it 
was also the time of increasing economic pressure, 
downsizing of personnel, early retirements, less solid 
education, job hopping, saving on maintenance, more 
complex plants, etc. which all together countered 
the trend of increasing process safety. Plants run 
Research article
p. 27 - 35, DOI 10.2478/v10281-012-0007-8
20
15
10
5
0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
L
T
IF
Contractor staff
Company staff
Transactions of the VŠB - Technical university of Ostrava
Safety Engineering Series 
Vol. VII, No. 2, 2012
28
by people with less overview and insight of what 
can go wrong, who are less alert due to all kinds 
of distraction, or who violate rules because it saves 
time and experienced nothing serious happened, can 
suddenly be confronted with an accident. In general, 
these latent threats went unnoticed at board level, 
because the LTIR was still further decreasing and 
safety was therefore not a priority.
Fig. 2 Left: the 2000-2009 LTIF per million hours 
worked of the International Association of Oil 
& Gas Producers, and Right: Dow Chemical Co 
Annual report 2007 metric on Injury and Illness 
rate per 200,000 hours from1996 to 2007 with 
future projection
Kletz (Kletz, 1993) had warned for such 
situation many years ago and Körvers (Körvers, 
2004) motivated his promotion work on accident 
precursors in 2000 - 2003 with references to Hopkins 
and Hale (Hopkins, 2000; Hale et al., 1998; see also 
Sonnemans and Körvers, 2006). Hopkins mentioned 
the Longford gas plant in Australia where in 1998 
a disastrous accident occurred while the LTIR of that 
plant was exemplary and Hale wrote that formulating 
reliable safety performance indicators constitutes 
a fundamental problem in safety science. It took till 
after the 2005 BP Texas City refi nery vapor cloud 
explosion (CSB, 2005) that - with a shock - the 
distinction between personal safety with the LTIR as 
indicator and the more hidden process safety became 
clear and installing process safety performance 
indicators became a priority item. The report by 
the Baker Panel (Baker et al., 2007) following the 
CSB investigation of the accident and examining 
all BP’s refi nery activities in the U.S. uncovered the 
leadership and management weaknesses and safety 
culture issues.
Fig. 3 Trend of accident reduction rate as presented 
in a Norsk Hydro Annual report in the late 1990s 
suggesting that a state of zero accidents would be 
reached not before long
Fig. 4 Körvers’ three layer hierarchical level with 
control elements and in the left top corner the result 
of his case studies showing that 63 % of unnoticed 
precursors can be ascribed to management failure 
(Körvers, 2004; Sonnemans and Körvers, 2006)
In fact, Patrick Körvers in his dissertation 
(Körvers, 2004) investigated many cases: fi rst using 
an accident data bank and later by doing investigative 
work in more detail at three process plants. He 
was looking to fi nd (hidden) accident precursors 
by checking process disturbances or deviations. If 
these reproduced and appeared to be safety critical, 
their cause was investigated applying a three layer 
hierarchical system of operational level, tactical, 
and strategic level; see Fig. 4. Each layer can be 
thought of as a control system consisting of a sensor 
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(observation), a processor (judgment) and an 
actuator (intervention), controlled by a supervising 
element of the next higher layer. Of each overlooked 
precursor the causation was traced and the failing 
element identifi ed. It turned out that the majority 
of unnoticed precursors could be ascribed to 
management failure.
Materials and methods
Leadership, management oversight, and 
control
As was realized already for a long time, in safety 
the role of leadership and good management is 
crucial. Since the Piper-Alpha disaster in 1988 and 
the push given by the Lord Cullen report the process 
industry introduced in the 1990s safety management 
systems. However, in general no explicit provisions 
were taken to check the effectiveness of the 
measures. A number of routines, such as having 
written procedures available, performance of 
HazOps and LOPAs, management of change, 
audits, training of personnel, etc. had been installed, 
but when year after year no near misses or worse 
happen, motivation to keep such routines  upfront in 
mind can easily erode.
Fig. 5 Deming PDCA cycle as the management 
guide for continuous product improvement. Its 
application was later more generalized, and the 
‘check’ stage by Deming renamed ‘study’ to 
monitor and investigate results of the ‘do’ stage and 
fi nd out what went wrong and how to improve
Management takes decision on the basis of 
indicators. As regards fi nancial indicators (profi t, 
losses) that is clear, but Deming introduced in the 
early 1950s the ‘wheel’, see Fig. 5, or the Plan, Do, 
Check and Act cycle for product quality, where the 
Check-stage can be interpreted as obtaining indicator 
values upon which corrective action can take place. 
So, early in the 2000-time frame, it was ‘in the air’ 
that safety performance indicators were necessary. The 
Working Group on Chemical Accidents of the OECD 
(Organization for Cooperation and Development, 
with head offi ce in Paris) issued in 2003 an interim 
Guidance on Safety Performance Indicators (OECD, 
2003) to support initiatives to establish indicators as 
e.g., the Responsible Care program of the chemical 
industry. UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2005) 
produced a practical guide. This was followed after the 
Texas City explosion at the BP site by publications of 
the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS, 2007a 
and b, 2010). Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) or 
Process Safety Performance Indicators (PSPIs, PSIs) 
suddenly got much attention, as appeared from various 
publications, such as of the UK Oil and Gas industry: 
the Step Change in Safety (UKOOA, 2006a and b), the 
American Petroleum Institute recommended practice 
754 (API, 2010), and the guideline by the European 
association of chemical industries (CEFIC, 2011). The 
European Process Safety Centre, EPSC and CEFIC 
organized last January 2012 an international conference 
on the topic.
Indicators can be divided into two main groups, 
the lagging and the leading ones defi ned as follows: 
“Lagging” Metrics - a retrospective set of metrics 
that are based on incidents that meet the threshold 
of severity that should be reported as part of the 
industry-wide process safety metric.
“Leading” Metrics - a forward looking set of 
metrics that indicate the performance of the key 
work processes, operating discipline, or layers of 
protection that prevent incidents.
“Near Miss” and other internal Lagging Metrics 
- the description of less severe incidents (i.e., below 
the threshold for inclusion in the industry lagging 
metric), or unsafe conditions, which activated one 
or more layers of protection. Although these events 
are actual events (hence, lagging), they are generally 
considered to be a good indicator of conditions that 
could ultimately lead to a severe incident (CCPS, 
2007a) and as such leading metric.
Fig. 6 Lagging and leading indicators according to 
CEFIC. The fi rst can be standardized as unintended 
releases of hazardous substances with consequences 
as described under a)-c)
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the other hand, there is enough to gain, also 
cost-wise, if they would control their operation 
better.
• Session 3: Going public. This fi nal goal is in line 
with that of Responsible Care to get the public to 
trust the industry more.  Pros and cons of opening 
the indicator results to the public were discussed. 
General conclusion was to make them public 
(which is also in line with the proposed Seveso 3 
Directive), but only after suffi cient experience has 
been obtained.
• Session 4: Leading indicators: Three main groups 
of leading indicators can be distinguished: 
- Mechanical integrity indicators (inspections, 
controls),
- Action items follow-ups: (PHA - Process Hazard 
Analysis, audit and near miss actions),
- Training/competence indicators in the form of 
quality testing, such as percent of personnel 
trained and how complete roles in process safety 
are defi ned and assigned.
Companies can select leading indicators 
according to their needs
As follow-on, in June a meeting has been held in 
Paris between representatives of OECD and CEOs 
of companies to discuss establishing process safety 
governance.
Results
In fact, the CCPS guidelines on the topic of 
process safety performance indicators resulted 
in a number of close to 400 possible indicators 
measuring the effectiveness of 22 management 
system elements. With so many indicators overview 
will be lost: only 5 to maximum 10 indicators can 
be handled sensibly. On the other hand, in safety 
‘the devil is in the detail’ and one has to monitor 
the right details to fi nd out where risk can develop. 
The solution to this dilemma will be aggregation. 
Hassan and Khan(Hassan and Khan, 2012) worked 
out an example of aggregation of a hundred specifi c 
indicators via some 40 key asset integrity indicators, 
13 activity indicators to 3 element indicators for 
comparing safety performance of fi ve oil and gas 
plants. In Fig. 7 the levels of aggregation are shown. 
The aggregation is risk-based. It means that, fi rst of 
all, the importance of each indicator for the overall 
safety and well-functioning of the plant is obtained as 
a weight factor by expert opinion in an AHP (Analytic 
Hierarchy Process) through a pair-wise comparison 
matrix. Secondly, the result of a lagging indicator 
is expressed as the frequency of the occurrence of 
At the EPSC-CEFIC conference 31 January and 
1 February 2012 Executive Director of CEFIC, Mr 
William Garcia, showed the indicator categories as 
in Fig. 6. It was also advised to not discuss whether 
an indicator is ‘lag’ or ‘lead’ for a time period 
longer than 10 minutes! In Safety Science journal 
Volume 47 in 2009 a discussion has been held at 
academic level triggered by an ‘Introductory story’ 
by Hopkins (Hopkins, 2009). A practical analysis 
was by Hudson (Hudson, 2009), who suggested 
considering control theory. Lagging indicators 
are to be compared with negative feedback and as 
such relatively simple: correct and recover. Leading 
indicators on the other hand mean feed-forward 
control which requires in fact a model to establish 
what correction and how much correction should be 
given. As a model a bow-tie (fault tree connected to 
an event tree of consequences by a central hazardous 
material release event, also called initiating event) 
could serve because it depicts the scenarios possible 
for an installation leading to breaches of process 
safety which can be quantifi ed as risks. This implies, 
however, that various ‘soft’ organizational and 
management infl uences and human error must be 
included in this model as well. Although this will 
generate new problems, it is a direction which should 
be further explored and to which we will return.
The conference consisted of four working 
sessions between an introductory and a summarizing 
plenary. In the Introductory plenary Mr. William 
Garcia, mentioned above, spoke on behalf of the 
ICCA, the International Council of Chemical 
Associations, promoting the introduction of 
indicators in the companies globally. Mr Kenan 
Stevick of Dow Chemical presented the position 
of the American Chemical Council (the equivalent 
of CEFIC) which is supporting a single global set 
of lagging process safety metrics, while for leading 
indicators fl exibility is needed and companies 
should choose their own. Incident severity shall be 
component of any metric. The metric scheme should 
become an ISO standard. The subjects of the four 
sessions in break-out groups were:
• Session 1: Implementing process safety performance 
indicators. This consisted of a series of industry 
speakers explaining their experiences to encourage 
others to start the process. Once a system runs, 
3-5 years are required to get it stable. 
• Session 2: Broaden the basis, was meant to 
discuss ways to convince the smaller companies 
to introduce indicators. Smaller companies 
have the handicap of possessing in general less 
expertise, sometimes even no safety management 
system. If they get indicators the results do not 
show a neat trend line but will fl uctuate. On 
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an incident multiplied with its severity, and that of 
a leading indicator as the percentage of the success 
multiplied with the importance of success. The result 
was quite satisfactory.
Fig. 7 Aggregation levels of indicators according 
to Hassan and Khan (Hassan and Khan, 2012), 
to provide insight through key indicators at work 
fl oor supervision level, activity ones to serve 
middle management, and three element indicators: 
operational integrity, maintenance integrity 
and personnel integrity for monitoring by top 
management
As long as the indicator values improve and 
there are no large fl uctuations in annual results, 
there will be no need to have an additional criterion 
for what is acceptable or not. This, however, will 
change as soon as values become stagnant or worse, 
when they decline. In that case a more direct relation 
with the magnitude of risk will become desirable. 
Given a risk expressed as a product of frequency 
and a severity, various options for decision making 
are available: use of a semi-quantitative risk matrix 
as e.g., in the standard IEC 61508 (IEC 61508, 
2010), comparison with business risks expressed 
in monetary units, legal constraints, and insurance 
requirements. Now we return to the bow-tie concept 
mentioned by Hudson (Hudson, 2009).
Bow-ties are composed of a fault tree and an event 
tree part. Both can to a certain extent be quantifi ed, 
and they can be very helpful in determining the 
effectiveness of preventive and protective barriers. 
However, the reliability of human action has never 
been incorporated in a detailed way because of its 
complexity. This is slowly changing. Thanks to 
the Bayesian Belief Network technique allowing 
larger fl exibility and versatility in probabilistic 
modeling, more complex causal relationships 
can be simulated. Causality has been studied by 
pioneers as e.g., (Pearl, 1988; Morgan and Pearl, 
2000), in the artifi cial intelligence domain to enable 
machine decision making. As a result of practical 
p. 27 - 35, DOI 10.2478/v10281-012-0007-8
software becoming available that takes away the 
computational burden, it has the last few years 
found very useful applications in medical science, 
social sciences, economy and fi nance, and software 
reliability determination. Recently it has been 
applied in aviation safety (Mohaghegh et al., 2009; 
Groth et al., 2010; Ale et al, 2009) and is starting 
to fi nd its way in Quantitative Risk Analysis of 
processes in on- and offshore (Khakzad et al., 2011; 
Pasman and Rogers, 2012a a,b; Vinnem et al., 2012).
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are cause-consequence 
chains and consist of nodes (also called vertices) 
and arcs (or edges). A node represents a stochastic 
variable, an arc a dependency. The simplest network 
is formed by two nodes, X (cause) and Y (effect), 
connected by a directed arc (an arrow from X to Y 
refl ecting the dependency). Networks are acyclic 
(an effect cannot be the cause of its cause!) and the 
variables can be discrete or continuous. In case of 
discretely valued variables with a certain probability 
to be in the states true or false, or, working or failed, 
the arc implies in the dependent node a conditional 
probability, the value of Pr(Y|X) or the probability that 
Y gets in a failed state given X fails, hence the strength 
of the infl uence of X on Y. In a multi-node network 
this will take the form of a conditional probability 
table. Solution is exact but gets cumbersome to 
determine if the nodes become numerous. In the 
continuous network a variable can have the form of 
a continuous probability distribution function, and 
the relationship can be expressed arithmetically, 
and solution to derive the joint distribution is by 
sampling. The networks are called Bayesian because 
the Bayesian theorem of availability of new evidence 
enabling updating and inference forms the core of its 
success. The networks are useful as tool to predict 
given root causes the probability of effects, but also 
the other way around; i.e., to diagnose causes on 
the basis of observation of consequences. Because 
of the network’s probabilistic nature, a node can be 
given a value on the basis of a belief (expert opinion) 
and the dependence between two nodes need not to 
be deterministic and not even to be a correlation, but 
can be just a rank correlation.  The rank correlation 
is the product moment correlation of the ranks of 
variables X and Y, and measures strength of the 
monotonic relationship between the two and hence 
the infl uence of one on the other. In particular 
a non-parametric continuous network, such as 
Uninet of Delft University of Technology, is suitable 
for that purpose (see e.g., Morales et al., 2008). 
All bowties can be modeled as a BN with much 
more possibilities to incorporate the complexities 
encountered in practice such as multi-mode and time 
effects, than the conventional techniques.
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The aviation safety application mentioned above 
went farthest in modeling human action and decision 
making in an organizational framework including 
error probability resulting in a BN of more than 
a thousand nodes.  Basis for this was also the work 
by Bellamy on occupational safety and occupational 
accident modeling, described in e.g., (Bellamy et al., 
2008; Ale et al., 2008). They applied accident data to 
create scenarios (Story-builder) schematized those 
in bow-ties including barriers.
Shown is a bow-tie of the fi rst gas-oil separator 
of a processing unit of an offshore platform 
according to a description and reliability data of 
Khan (Khan et al., 2002) and modeled as a Bayesian 
network. The separator contains about 5000 kg of 
hydrocarbons which by overpressure can BLEVE or 
as a leak can form an explosive vapor cloud. The 
consequences part to the right of the critical event 
is expanded to calculate the damage cost due to 
loss of life and materiel.  Added are the three top 
asset integrity indicators to the left with the weight 
factors defi ned by Hassan and Khan (Hassan and 
Khan, 2012), where the personnel indicator is taken 
as the dominant one. The indicators infl uence parts 
of the installation of which can be assumed that their 
functioning is much dependent on the quality of 
operation and maintenance or on right design (e.g., 
component no. 12: safety valve designed too small). 
The infl uence is constituted such that the failure rate 
is inversely proportional with the integrity value. 
A change of a factor of two in personnel integrity 
implies in this set-up a change of a factor of ten in 
fi nal risk as shown in the table at the bottom right.
Vinnem et al. (Vinnem et al., 2012) developed 
after several preparatory studies, following Ale 
et al. and Groth (Ale et al., 2009; Groth et al., 2010), 
and further building on an extensive experience 
with offshore technical risk assessment, a model 
integrating organizational, human and technical 
factors. To that end the authors introduced the 
concept of risk infl uencing factor or RIF. RIFs 
come in two layers: bottom layer are management 
properties infl uencing the upper layer of work 
force conditions, such as competence, available 
documentation, and time pressure. The upper layer 
of RIFs infl uences probability of human mistake, of 
slips and lapses and of acts of violation.
From the approach by Vinnem et al. (Vinnem et 
al., 2012) to a coupling with indicator values which 
are exponents of the safety management system is 
not a big step. In fact, Pasman and Rogers, building 
on an earlier paper of Knegtering and Pasman 
(Knegtering and Pasman, 2012), are presenting 
a paper at the MKOPSC symposium, October 2012 
about the principle as illustrated in Fig. 8. The 
approach is to a certain extent different from the one 
by Vinnem et al. (Vinnem et. al., 2012), in the sense 
that risk factors are defi ned both from organizational 
and human nature as well as from environmental 
and technical origin. Indicators are considered as 
Fig. 8 Example to illustrate the future possibility of a more comprehensive risk assessment including 
organizational factors
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just part of the risk factors with the leading ones 
mostly infl uencing safety on the long or middle 
term, while other risk factors, such as equipment 
vibration, bad weather and many others, may act 
on the short term. The idea is that the model may 
produce also an urgency of taking measure. All this 
is rather preliminary and has still to be worked out 
in concrete projects.
Conclusion
• Indicators are indispensable to monitor the state 
of process safety in a plant. Lagging indicators are 
based on incidents. The threshold of severity for 
counting them as signifi cant shall be standardized. 
Leading indicators shall be selected freely.  Near 
misses are important and shall be meticulously 
investigated and corrections implemented.
• International/global acceptability of a standard on 
indicators is sought. As soon as indicator results 
are stable and can be relied on, which can take 3 - 
5 years, it is desirable to go public to gain trust.
• As long as year after year improvement can be 
shown, there may be no need for a criterion of 
acceptability, but if results become stagnant or 
even get worse, a criterion will become required. 
Connecting indicators with a risk level and 
assessing the risk in a risk matrix will be a way to 
proceed.
• Modeling of risk with inclusion of organizational, 
management and human factors with the 
potential use of indicator values is at an initial 
stage.  Progress is being made due to the advent 
of Bayesian Belief network software allowing 
complex causality relations in probabilistic terms, 
so that ‘vague’ infl uences and expert opinion can 
be incorporated.
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